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I. INTRODUCTION
College campuses in America are not insulated communities divorced from
crime.1 One of the most pervasive crimes on campuses is sexual assault.2 Up to
one in five undergraduate students is “a victim of an attempted or completed
sexual assault,” and repeat offenders perpetrate nine out of ten assaults.3 Sexual
1. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUB. SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 424, at 5 (Apr. 28, 2015).
2. Attorney General Kamala D. Harris, UC President Janet Napolitano Take Steps to Address Campus
Sexual Assault, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.ca.gov/campus-sexual-assault (last visited Sept. 20,
2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter “Steps to Address”].
3. Id. Research suggests “[ninety percent] of rapes at colleges are perpetrated by [three percent] of college
men.” Kristina Mastropasqua, Sexual Assault and Rape on U.S. College Campuses: Research Roundup,
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assault rates on campuses “account[] for some of the highest casualty counts in
the nation.”4 Despite the high frequency of sexual assaults on campuses, they are
severely underreported; as many as eighty percent of victims choose not to report
5
their assaults. Additionally, many campuses mishandle the sexual assault cases
that are reported.6
The University of California, Berkeley (U.C. Berkeley) offers illustrative
examples of victims who felt dissatisfied with the campus process after reporting
their sexual assaults.7 Aryle Butler, a U.C. Berkeley student, suffered repeated
sexual assaults from a fellow student during a summer program.8 When she
reported the assaults to administrators, they responded “it wasn’t their problem,”
and “admonish[ed] her ‘regarding the consequences of falsely reporting sexual
assaults.’”9 Nicoletta Commins, another U.C. Berkeley student, was sexually
assaulted in 2012 as a junior.10 Commins reported the incident to both the student
11
health center and the City of Berkeley Police Department. U.C. Berkeley failed
to investigate her sexual assault report and did not notify Commins that its
12
investigations had ended. Both of these women could not rely on their school to
handle their sexual assault cases and instead turned to the legal system.13
The pervasiveness of campus sexual assaults has attracted national
14
attention. “In 2014, President Obama appointed the White House Task Force to
Protect Students from Sexual Assaults” to investigate and recommend options to
reduce the frequency of sexual assaults on college campuses and to improve
15
handling sexual assault cases with repeat offenders. California is also
attempting to hold campuses more accountable by increasing reporting
requirements, moving from a “no means no” consent standard to a “yes means
yes” consent standard, lowering the burden of proof for sexual assaults, and,
JOURNALIST’S RES. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://journalistsresource.org/studies/society/public-health/sexual-assaultrape-us-college-campuses- research-roundup (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
4. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUB. SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 424, at 5 (Apr. 28, 2015).
5. Steps to Address, supra note 2.
6. See Tyler Kingkade, A Big Problem in How Campus Police Handle Sexual Assaults, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/06/student-sexual-assaultpolice_n_3849948.html
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that campus police mishandling a victim’s
sexual assault report is a common experience among victims).
7. See Jessica Testa, Three Students Sue UC Berkeley for Mishandling Sexual Assaults, BUZZFEED NEWS
(June 29, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/jtes/three-students-sue-uc-berkeley-for-mishandling-sexual-assaul#.
ufjG7QZq1 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that three students filed suit against
University of California, Berkeley regarding the way the university handled their sexual assault cases).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Mastropasqua, supra note 3 (discussing President Obama’s appointment of a White House Task
Force to take national action to prevent sexual assaults).
15. Id.
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through Chapter 159, expanding campus police’s surveillance authority by
allowing campus police to wear body cameras and record students in sexual
assault investigations without both party’s consent.16
This Comment discusses California’s current campus sexual assault
scheme,17 reviews Chapter 159,18 and analyzes how Chapter 159 will contribute to
investigation of sexual assault cases, including the role of campus police in
resolving sexual assault cases that proceed to formal criminal charges and the
potential concerns that may arise if campus officers are given expanded
surveillance authority.19 Finally, Part IV.B–C will discuss potential chilling
effects on speech and invasion of privacy as well as the lack of regulation on
campus police body camera usage.20
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section A will examine the current statutory scheme for handling campus
21
sexual assaults. Section B will discuss relevant surveillance laws, including the
Invasion of Privacy Act.22 Section C will explore the exceptions to the Invasion
23
of Privacy Act and how campus police fall outside those exceptions. Finally,
24
Section D will address the statutes currently applicable to body cameras.
A. Federal and State Campus Sexual Assault Laws
Title IX, a federal law prohibiting sex discrimination in federally funded
education programs and activities, states that “no person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance.”25 Title IX, passed in 1972, did not
originally provide a basis for student-to-student sexual assault claims on college

16. Steps to Address, supra note 2; see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (a)(1) (requiring campuses receiving
state funds to adopt a lower standard of affirmative consent).
17. See infra Part II (discussing campus sexual assault jurisprudence and regulatory schemes).
18. See infra Part III (showing that Chapter 159 expanded the authority of campus police by removing the
all-party consent limit for sexual assault cases and body cameras).
19. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the role of campus police in preventing sexual assault through
expanded investigations).
20. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the lack of regulation over campus police usages of body cameras).
21. See infra Part II.A (discussing campus sexual assault jurisprudence and regulatory schemes).
22. Infra Part II.B.
23. Infra Part II.C.
24. Infra Part II.D.
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1681; Overview of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/overview-title-ix-education-amendments-1972-20-usc-1681-et-seq (last visited Jan.
28, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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26

campuses. In 1997, though, the U.S. Department of Education’s Officer for
Civil Rights (OCR) began issuing administrative guidance on Title IX’s
application in student-to-student sexual assaults.27 Although the OCR’s
administrative guidelines are not promulgated rules, campuses generally adhere
to them because the OCR has the authority to withhold federal funding from
campuses in violation of Title IX.28 In 2001, the OCR issued a memorandum
requiring schools to conduct a “prompt, thorough, and impartial” investigation
into any reported allegations of rape or sexual assault.29 Ten years later, the OCR
issued another memorandum requiring a “preponderance of the evidence”
standard for all campus tribunals: “more likely than not that sexual harassment or
violence occurred.”30 The memorandum also required that victims receive notice
of their legal rights, including the right to sue the educational institution in civil
court or file a complaint with the OCR.31
California’s Education Code also requires college campuses receiving state
funds to: (1) adopt an affirmative consent standard for campus disciplinary
32
33
proceedings; (2) adopt victim-centered policies; and (3) enter into memoranda
of understanding (MOU) with law enforcement agencies, victim services
34
organizations, or other community service organizations. The California
Attorney General assisted colleges with implementing the MOU requirement by
releasing a model MOU.35 The model MOU effectuates the goals of coordination
and collaboration between campuses and law enforcement agencies, and also
increases transparency of campus administration and campus police responses to
reports of sexual assault on college campuses.36 When a campus employee or
campus police officer learns of a sexual assault on campus, he or she is required

26. Stephen Henrick, Comment, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 51 (2013).
27. Id.
28. OFF. OF CIVIL RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT
OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 52 (2001), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ docs/shguide.html [hereinafter REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
GUIDANCE] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 59–60; Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
31. Id. at 52.
32. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a)(1) (West 2015).
33. Id. § 67386(b).
34. Id. § 67386(c).
35. Campus Sexual Assault—General Frequently Asked Questions, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF J., OFFICE
OF THE ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.ca.gov/campus-sexual-assault-general-faqs (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
36. Id.
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to notify the local law enforcement agency member of the MOU agreement as
soon as practicably possible.37
B. Surveillance Jurisprudence and Statutes
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court held in Berger v. New York that
38
Fourth Amendment privacy protection applies to eavesdropping devices. The
same year, in Katz v. United States, the Court ruled that protection doesn’t
require physical intrusion in order to be implicated.39 Justice Harlan’s
concurrence implicated the Fourth Amendment when there is both a subjective
and objective “reasonable expectation of privacy.”40 Justice Harlan’s concurrence
effectively replaced the majority opinion as the law, due to its clearly articulated
test that courts could easily apply.41 In 1971, the Court decided United States v.
White, and concluded that White’s “misplaced belief that a person to whom he
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it” is not protected under the
42
Fourth Amendment because is not a reasonable expectation of privacy. Without
White’s knowledge or permission, his friend wore a wire during White’s
43
confession. White argued that the wire violated his reasonable expectation of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment, but the Court held his expectation of
privacy during his confession of wrongdoing was not a reasonable expectation of
44
privacy. In justifying its holding, the Court stated that not all expectations of
privacy are reasonable, and the law permits the frustration of actual expectations
of privacy when they are objectively unreasonable, as White’s was when he
45
expected another person to keep his confession confidential.
As a direct response to Berger and Katz, Congress passed Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Title III), which “governs the
interception and capture of wire and other specified communications.”46 Title III
permits law enforcement and private persons to intercept communications
without a warrant when one of the participants of the communication is the

37. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67380(a)(6)(A) (West 2015).
38. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 52 (1967).
39. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967).
40. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
41. Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 1, 7 (2009); see Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 44 (2001) (showing that the court cited Harlan’s concurrence
in Katz in its determinations of whether using thermal imager to detect heat waves is a search).
42. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966)).
43. Id. at 752.
44. Id. at 752.
45. Id. at 752.
46. Daniel R. Dinger, Should Parents Be Allowed To Record a Child’s Telephone Conversations When
They Believe the Child Is in Danger?: An Examination of the Federal Wiretap Statute and the Doctrine of
Vicarious Consent in the Context of a Criminal Prosecution, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 955, 957–59 (2005).
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interceptor or consents to the interception, thereby extending White’s reasoning
past the informant wearing a wire, to any consenting party using electronic
communication.47 A number of states have adopted this one-party consent
48
exception to Title III’s warrant requirement.
To counter Congress’s expansion of one-party consent for eavesdropping
under Title III, the California Legislature passed the Invasion of Privacy Act in
1967. The Act aimed to protect Californians’ right to privacy because
technological advances created a “serious threat to the free exercise of personal
liberties.”49 The Act prohibits the use of electronic eavesdropping devices without
50
the consent of all parties to the communication. The all-party consent
requirement contrasts with Title III’s one-party consent standard by disallowing
secret recordings when only one party is aware of the recording.51 This goes
beyond the Fourth Amendment minimum protections.52 The California
Legislature updated the Invasion of Privacy Act in 1992 to prohibit
53
eavesdropping of cellphones and cordless telephones. A violation of the
54
Invasion of Privacy Act is “punishable by a fine, imprisonment or both.”
Generally, evidence in California is admissible unless statutes provide
55
restrictions. The Invasion of Privacy Act also restricts the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the Act from being used “in any judicial,
administrative, legislative, or other proceeding.”56
C. Exceptions to the Invasion of Privacy Act and Wiretapping Statutes
57

There are numerous exceptions to California’s Invasion of Privacy Act.
California Penal Code Section 633 exempts the Attorney General, district
attorneys, traditional law enforcement agencies, and those acting under the
direction of these exempted groups.58 Penal Code Section 633.5 allows private
citizens to eavesdrop for the purpose of gathering evidence for certain crimes,

47. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)–(d) (illustrating that law enforcement and private persons may intercept
communications when one party to the communication is the person intercepting or gives consent to another to
intercept).
48. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 5:1 (2014).
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (West 2015); see id. § 631 (showing that the Invasion of Privacy Act
prohibited interception of wireless technology).
50. PENAL §§ 631(a), 632(a).
51. Id. § 631(a).
52. Id. § 631(a).
53. Id. §§ 632.5–632.7.
54. ROBERT D. LINKS, CAL. CIV. PRAC. CIVIL RTS. LITIG. § 6:17 (2015).
55. See EVID. § 351 (stating that this section “abolish[es] all limitations on the admissibility of the
relevant evidence except those that are based on a statute”).
56. PENAL §§ 631(c), 632(c).
57. See id. §§ 633–633.5 (showing the many exemptions from Penal Code Sections 631 and 632).
58. Id. § 633.
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including “extortion, kidnapping, bribery and felonies involving violence against
the person.”59 Although the Invasion of Privacy Act does not allow evidence
obtained through unlawful eavesdropping or recording to be admitted in court,
evidence gathered under Penal Code Section 633 or 633.5 are considered lawful
and may be admitted as evidence in a “judicial, administrative, legislative, or
other proceeding.”60 Further, when there is an exception from the Invasion of
Privacy Act, the consent basis for eavesdropping defaults to federal law—Title
III—and only requires one-party consent to the communication for the evidence
to be admissible.61
Unlike traditional law enforcement agencies, campus police are not exempt
from the Invasion of Privacy Act.62 Consequently, campus police must obtain allparty consent unless they are eavesdropping for a crime enumerated in the
Invasion of Privacy Act: “extortion, kidnapping, bribery and violent felonies.”63
The enumeration language is unclear on whether campus police may eavesdrop
64
and record sexual assaults with only one-party consent.
65
Wiretapping is a separate basis for eavesdropping and recording. Under
Title III, states are required “to enact an enabling statute” that authorizes
66
electronic surveillance, including wiretapping. In 2010, Chapter 707 amended
67
the California wiretapping statutes to their current form. The statutes define
“wiretapping” as the interception of aural transfers, which are transmissions
68
containing a “human voice at any point.” The statute permits traditional law
69
enforcement officers, not campus police, to apply for court orders to wiretap. In

59. Id. § 633.5.
60. See id. §§ 633–633.5 (showing that these sections are not subject to the eavesdropping and recording
law restrictions on evidence admissibility).
61. See People v. Wojahn, 169 Cal. App. 2d 135, 143 (1959) (illustrating that eavesdropping laws do not
apply when there is consent of one party).
62. See PENAL § 633 (showing that university, college, and campus police are not included in the exempt
law enforcement agencies from Sections 631 and 632).
63. See id. § 633.5 (explaining that nothing stops a party to a confidential communication from recording
to obtain evidence for the crimes of extortion, kidnapping, bribery, and any felony involving violence against
the person).
64. See id. §§ 631–32 (requiring consent from all parties before eavesdropping or recording); see also id.
§ 633 (noting that people under the direction of one of the exempted law enforcement authorities are also
exempt).
65. See PENAL § 629.51 (showing that the Penal Code applies to the interception of wire
communications).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (discussing the need for an enabling statute for intercepting electronic
communications).
67. PENAL § 629.98; Complete Bill History of SB 1428, http://leginfo.legislature.ca.
gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml? bill_id=200920100SB1428 (last visited Aug. 5, 2015) (on file with The
University of Pacific Law Review). The enabling statute contains a sunset provision set to expire on January 1,
2020. PENAL § 629.98.
68. PENAL § 629.51.
69. See id. § 629.50 (granting the applications to wiretap to traditional law enforcement agencies, not
campus police).
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order to receive court orders for wiretapping, traditional law enforcement officers
must describe the particular offense in detail for the authorization order,
including the identity of the people whose communication will be intercepted, the
type of communication sought, and the period of time the interception is
authorized.70 Officers are also required to demonstrate that “normal investigative
procedures” will not work, are unlikely to succeed, or will likely be too
71
dangerous. Finally, officers may wiretap only for crimes enumerated under the
wiretapping statutes.72
D. Limited Body Camera Laws
The Invasion of Privacy Act does not specifically mention body cameras, but
it does prohibit electronic recording without the consent of all parties to the
73
communication. Because body cameras can be used to record video and audio
of conversations, use of body cameras are likely to fall under the purview of the
74
Invasion of Privacy Act. Penal Code Section 633 exempts traditional law
enforcement agencies from the all-party consent requirement; therefore, law
enforcement officers may use body cameras as long as the officers are parties to
75
the recorded communication. Because campus police are subject to the Invasion
of Privacy Act, they are required to obtain consent from all parties to a
76
communication before they can record it. Assuming that body camera footage is
part of the public record, an agency has ten days after receiving a request for
documents to determine whether to disclose the body camera footage as public
record, or provide the person requesting it with the reasons or determinations for
77
non-disclosure. A few cities in California, including Rialto and San Diego,
78
outfit police officers with body cameras to film public interactions.

70. See generally id. § 629.50 (stating the many requirements to obtain a court wiretapping order).
71. Id. § 629.52(d).
72. See id. § 629.52 (illustrating that court orders authorizing interception of wire communication require
a probable cause showing of an enumerated offense).
73. See id. § 632 (prohibiting electronic recording of communications, even with consent).
74. See LINDSAY MILLER & JESSICA TOLIVER, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 5 (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
472014912134715246869.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (illustrating that body
worn cameras record video and audio); see PENAL § 632 (stating that people face fines or prison time if
eavesdrop or record confidential communications through recording device).
75. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 48, at § 5:22 (explaining that one-party consent means the
wiretap statute does not apply to law enforcement); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.52 (West 2015) (failing to
list sexual assaults as an enumerated crime means a court order for wiretapping is not available).
76. PENAL § 632.
77. GOV’T § 6253(c).
78. MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 74 at 3–8.
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III. CHAPTER 159
Chapter 159 exempts Public Safety Officer Standards and Training (POST)certified campus officers from the Invasion of Privacy Act’s restrictions on
eavesdropping, and other surveillance technologies, and permits POST-certified
campus police to use body cameras.79 This allows campus police to lawfully
eavesdrop or record using practices developed prior to January 1, 1968, including
80
one-party consent. The exemption’s scope is limited to investigations of sexual
assault and other sexual offenses.81 Finally, Chapter 159 also states that it should
“not be construed” to affect Penal Code Section 633 and that it should “not be
used to impinge the lawful exercise of constitutionally protected rights of
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, or right of personal privacy.”82
IV. ANALYSIS
Section A will discuss how the expansion of campus officers’ investigation
83
authority will contribute to the handling of campus sexual assault cases. Section
B examines concerns of chilling valuable speech and invasion of privacy, which
84
may result from campus police officers’ expanded surveillance authority.
Finally, Section C focuses on Chapter 159’s lack of regulation of campus police
body camera usage.85
A. Expanded Investigations: An Important Piece of the Puzzle
Chapter 159 is part of a wider effort to address how campus police and
administrations handle campus sexual assaults.86 Chapter 159 removes the limits
on campus officers’ investigation authority and provides them with more
investigative tools.87 One such tool is the pretext phone call: a recorded call
between the victim and the suspect, usually made under law enforcement
79. PENAL § 633.02(a) (enacted by Chapter 159).
80. See id. (showing that campus officers are not prohibited from recording or hearing any
communications that they could do prior to January 1, 1968 in a criminal investigation for sexual assault or
other sexual offense); People v. Wojahn, 169 Cal. App. 2d 135, 143 (1959) (stating that 1959 laws on
eavesdropping and recording telephone communications did not apply when one party to a communication
consented).
81. PENAL § 633.02(a) (enacted by Chapter 159).
82. Id. § 633.02(c) (enacted by Chapter 159).
83. Infra Part IV.A (discussing the role of campus police in preventing sexual assault through expanded
investigations).
84. Infra Part IV.B (discussing whether expanded surveillance will adversely affect privacy and the
exchange of ideas).
85. Infra Part IV.C (discussing the lack of regulation over campus police usages of body cameras).
86. See supra Part II.A (illustrating the laws and influences in place for handling sexual assaults).
87. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 633.02(a) (enacted by Chapter 159) (showing that Penal Code 631 and 632
limits on eavesdropping and recording do not apply to campus officers in sexual assault investigations).
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88

supervision and without the suspect’s knowledge that the call is being recorded.
Pretext phone calls provide some of the best evidence of sexual assaults.89 Pretext
phone calls are one-party consent and thus prohibited under the Invasion of
90
Privacy Act without an exemption. Before Chapter 159, state law was unclear
about whether campus officers could use the pretext phone call strategy without a
warrant.91 Campus officers had to gain assistance from other law enforcement
agencies who could, under the Invasion of Privacy Act exemptions, use pretext
phone calls on sexual assault cases.92 Chapter 159 eliminates the need for other
agencies, enhancing campus officers’ abilities to investigate sexual assaults
93
effectively and quickly. Now, an officer may employ the pretext phone call
soon after receiving a sexual assault report, increasing the chance of eliciting
critical evidence.94
Although Chapter 159 excuses campus police from the Invasion of Privacy
Act, California’s wiretapping laws do not specifically list campus police or
enumerate sexual assault as a crime for which a judge may grant a wiretapping
order, which leaves the law unclear as to whether campus officers have the
authority to wiretap during sexual assault investigations.95 This is in contrast to
traditional law enforcement officers, who have the authority to eavesdrop or
96
record in a broader range of criminal investigations. Even if campus officers
could wiretap for sexual assaults, the process to obtain a wiretap court order is
97
rigorous. The wiretapping statutes require officers to describe particular facts

88. HAROLD EISENGA, USING “PRETEXT” PHONE CALLS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT INVESTIGATIONS 1 (2004),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/179946.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
89. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB
424, at 6 (July 7, 2015).
90. CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (West 2015); see PENAL § 631 (showing that the Invasion of Privacy Act
prohibited interception of wireless technology).
91. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUB. SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 992, at 6–7 (Apr. 19,
2005) (showing disagreement on campus officers’ authority under Penal Code sections 631 and 632 to employ
pretext phone calls).
92. See ASSEMBLY ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS ON SB 424, at 3
(July 7, 2015) (stating SB 424 “will enable college and university police agencies to do ‘pretext’ calls between
victim and the alleged perpetrator”).
93. Id.
94. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUB. SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 992, at 7 (Apr. 19, 2005).
95. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.52 (enacted by Chapter 159) (not listing sexual assault as a crime supporting
a court order to wiretap).
96. Compare id. at § 633.5 (showing that law enforcement is exempt from Sections 631 and 632, and has
no restrictions to certain crimes), with PENAL § 633.02(a) (enacted by Chapter 159) (showing that campus
police are exempt from Sections 631 and 632 only for sexual assault investigations).
97. See supra Part II.C (illustrating numerous procedures and showings that an officer must make in order
to get a wiretapping order).
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98

and demonstrate the need to wiretap. Even if campus police are able to wiretap,
their jurisdiction is more limited than city or county police.99
Despite providing new investigation tools to campus police, Chapter 159
does not explicitly state evidence obtained in sexual assault investigations is
admissible in adjudicative proceedings, such as campus disciplinary
proceedings.100 The language in Penal Code Sections 631 and 632 states that “no
evidence obtained in violation of this section shall be admissible in any judicial,
administrative, legislative, or other proceeding.”101 Yet, the exceptions in Penal
Code Sections 633 and 633.5 explicitly allow for evidence obtained through
eavesdropping and recording to be admitted in a “judicial, administrative,
legislative or other proceeding,” making Chapter 159’s silence on admissibility
curious.102 Due to this quirk in the statutory scheme, the admissibility of evidence
gained through Chapter 159 is unclear.103 However, campus officers’ actions that
comply with Chapter 159 will likely comply with Penal Code Sections 631 and
104
632, and it would be a strange result to allow campus officers to eavesdrop and
record conversations regarding sexual assaults, while simultaneously disallow the
that same evidence to be used in a “judicial, administrative, legislative, or other
105
proceeding.” For that reason, it is likely that evidence obtained through Chapter
106
159 is admissible in other proceedings.
Assuming Penal Code Sections 631 and 632 do not exclude evidence
obtained under Chapter 159, the incentive towards guilty convictions may
98. PENAL § 629.50(a)(4) (West 2015).
99. Compare id. § 633.5 (completely exempting law enforcement from Sections 631 and 632), with
PENAL § 633.02(a) (enacted by Chapter 159) (exempting campus police from Sections 631 and 632 only for
sexual assault investigations).
100. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631(c), 632(c) (West 2015) (showing that evidence obtained by
eavesdropping and recording may not be admitted in “judicial, administrative, legislative, or other
proceedings”), with PENAL § 633.02 (enacted by Chapter 159) (making no mention of the admissibility of
evidence). Campus disciplinary proceedings are preferred by many sexual assault victims because of their lower
standard of proof and lack of police involvement. Jill Filipovic, Are Campus Disciplinary Hearings Really the
Right
Way
to
Try
a
Rape
Case?,
COSMOPOLITAN
(July
15,
2014)
http://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/news/a29003/william-smith-college-rape/ (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review). However, many students feel campus proceedings lack confidentiality. Id. Reporting
sexual assaults to the police do not offer a better alternative, with higher proof requirements and low conviction
rates. Id.
101. PENAL §§ 631–32 (West 2015).
102. See id. §§ 633, 633.5 (making no reference to the eavesdropping and recording law restrictions on
evidence admissibility).
103. Compare id. § 633 (explicitly allowing for admission of evidence obtained under this provision),
with PENAL § 633.02 (enacted by Chapter 159) (containing no language allowing the admission of evidence
obtained under this provision).
104. See PENAL § 633.02 (enacted by Chapter 159) (stating that Penal Code sections 631 and 632 does
not apply to campus officer investigating sexual assaults).
105. See supra Part II.C (illustrating that every other exception to Penal Code sections 631 and 632
allows admission of evidence in a “judicial, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding”).
106. See id. (illustrating that every other exception to Penal Code sections 631 and 632 allows admission
of evidence in a “judicial, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding”).
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potentially lead college administrations and campus police departments to
disregard accused students’ procedural rights.107 Title IX incentivizes campuses to
resolve sexual assault cases with guilty convictions.108 The incentive exists
because a college’s deliberate indifference to a victim’s claim could lead to a
federal OCR violation, which puts the school at risk for loss of federal funding,
while deliberate indifference towards an accused student’s innocence does not
109
have sex discrimination implications under Title IX. California also implicitly
favors more convictions by requiring campuses to adopt the “yes means yes”
affirmative consent standard to continue receiving state funding.110 The
affirmative consent standard in campus proceedings results in a lighter burden of
proof making it easier to resolve a campus proceeding with a guilty conviction.111
In general, convictions are more likely to quell accusations that campuses are
discriminating by mishandling sexual assault complaints. However, “no assault”
findings fail to show whether the accused was innocent or whether the college
112
administration’s led an inadequate investigation.
While Chapter 159 does not address procedural rights, there are other
influential sources that may potentially address those rights.113 Campuses that
disregard an accused student’s rights may face procedural due process challenges
114
in the future. For example, a California judge invalidated the suspension of an
accused student at the University of California, San Diego.115 The judge found
that the campus denied the accused student his due process rights when it did not
allow the student to cross-examine his accuser during the campus sexual assault
hearing.116
Although the accused students’ rights are an important concern, not
admitting evidence that has a high likelihood of proving guilt has a net effect of

107. Henrick, supra note 26, at 54.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 53–54.
110. Compare id. at 59–60 (showing that OCR requires campuses receiving federal funds to adopt a
preponderance of the evidence standard for campus proceedings), with CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (a)(1)
(requiring campuses receiving state funds to adopt a lower standard of affirmative consent).
111. Id.; See Lani Anne Remick, Comment, Read Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard
in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1103, 1121 (1993) (showing that a verbal affirmative consent standard may be over
inclusive).
112. Henrick, supra note 26.
113. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 633.02 (enacted by Chapter 159) (failing to mention accused students).
114. See Braxton v. Mun. Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 138, 154 (1973) (invalidating an order for failure to provide the
accused student a hearing as required by constitutional due process).
115. Ashe Schow, Judge Rules Campus Kangaroo Court ‘Unfair,’ WASH. EXAMINER (July 13, 2015),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/due-process-win-california-judge-rules-campus-kangaroo-court-unfair/
article/2568180 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
116. Id.
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decreasing acquittals of defendants that are “most likely to be innocent.” By
allowing admission of evidence from previously prohibited methods, Chapter
159 will make campus proceedings more accurate and provide campus officers
118
with more investigation tools for campus sexual assault claims.
B. Will Expanded Surveillance Doom Privacy and the Exchange of Ideas?
While Chapter 159 expands campus police surveillance capacities, it also
contains limiting language forbidding campus officers from using their expanded
surveillance authority to impinge on individual freedom of speech, the right to
assemble, and the right to privacy.119 Despite the limiting language, public
interest groups, like the ACLU, are concerned that campus police officers’
expanded surveillance authority will result in a chilling effect on the freedom of
speech and freedom of expression, and lead to “adversarial relationships between
120
campus police, faculty, and the student body.” A “chilling effect” is a concern
121
that a law “may deter potentially valuable expression.” When there is
surveillance of intellectual matters, it may lead people to avoid experimenting
122
with “new, controversial, or deviant” ideas. This chilling effect is especially
undesirable on college campuses, which thrive on the “free exchange of views
and ideas.”123
Giving campus police expanded surveillance authority also raises concerns
that such authority will encourage campus police to engage in electronic
surveillance inconsistent with “the expectation of privacy.”124 There is a potential
125
that increased surveillance will threaten intellectual privacy. Intellectual
privacy is the idea that people are best able to develop new ideas away from
public exposure, and that there should be protection from surveillance in order to
effectuate this value.126 Although Chapter 159 states that it should not be
interpreted to impinge on freedom of speech, assembly, and the right to privacy,

117. See Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585
(2013) (explaining that not admitting evidence of people most likely to be found guilty has a net effect of
decreasing the chance of acquittal of defendants that are “most likely to be innocent”).
118. See PENAL § 633.02 (enacted by Chapter 159) (failing to touch on accused students’ procedural
rights while only touching upon campus officers’ expanded eavesdropping and recording authority).
119. See id. (showing that campus police sexual assault investigations are no longer restricted); Id.
§ 633.02(d) (enacted by Chapter 159).
120. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUB. SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 424, at 7 (Apr. 28, 2015)
(illustrating the ACLU’s concerns that expanded surveillance will have a chilling effect on speech and invade
the right to privacy).
121. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1949 (2013).
122. Id. at 1935.
123. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUB. SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 424, at 7 (Apr. 28, 2015).
124. Id. at 8.
125. Richards, supra note 121, at 1945.
126. Id. at 1945–46.
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many surveillance claims will not reach the courts in the first place. Courts
have routinely dismissed suits against government surveillance for lack of
standing.128 For example, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme
Court held that the respondents had no standing because their fear of targeted
surveillance was “highly speculative” and the threat of surveillance was not
imminent.129 However, it is undetermined by the courts if a plaintiff from a
130
private college will have standing to bring a surveillance claim. Thus, while
Chapter 159’s interpretation clause provides an in court remedy, if the plaintiffs
lack standing in court, the remedy is not useful in protecting intellectual
131
privacy.
Furthermore, there may be no legitimate privacy issues regarding the use of
pretext phone calls.132 In United States v. White, the Supreme Court held that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in scenarios where the wrongdoer
reveals information to a person who later reveals the call to law enforcement,
133
whether recording technology is involved or not. Applied to pretext phone
calls, expecting that another person will keep communications confidential is not
reasonable.134
Chapter 159 only expands campus police officers’ authority to eavesdrop and
135
record for sexual assault investigations. Because Chapter 159’s expansion of
surveillance authority does not grant “broad powers of surveillance,” it is
unlikely to have a chilling effect on speech or assembly, nor will it impinge on
136
privacy in a meaningful way.
C. Body Cameras Without Appropriate Oversight
Currently, there is widespread public support for officers’ use of body
cameras.137 High profile use-of-force incidents are behind the push for body
127. See id. at 1944 (explaining that surveillance cases are often invalidated under standing grounds).
128. Id.
129. 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013).
130. C.f. Hernandez v. Hillside, 47 Cal. 4th 272 (2009) (holding that an employee had standing to bring
an invasion of privacy claim against his private employer).
131. Supra Part IV.B.
132. Infra Part IV.B.
133. White, 401 U.S. 750, 752–53 (1971).
134. Id. at 752.
135. CAL. PENAL CODE § 633.02(a) (enacted by Chapter 159).
136. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUB. SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 424, at 7 (Apr. 28, 2015).
137. See Americans Overwhelmingly Supports Body Cams for Cops, PRIVACY SOS (May 5, 2015, 3:38
PM), https://privacysos.org/node/1728 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing both
black and white Americans surveyed favor body cameras for police); see also Mike DeForest, Police Body
Camera Policies Differ, CLICK ORLANDO (June 29, 2015, 12:58 PM), http://www.clickorlando.com/news/
police-body-camera-policies-differ/33831406 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting
that many civil rights organizations and police associations have urged departments to invest in body cameras
following controversial use-of-force incidents).
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cameras and studies have shown promising decreases in the number of public
complaints against officers and use-of-force incidents when body cameras are
used.138 The presence of body cameras is also associated with a civilizing effect
that keeps officers and citizens on their best behavior because both know they are
being recorded.139 Chapter 159 allows campus officers to use body cameras with
only one-party consent.140 However, Chapter 159 does not provide policies
141
governing campus officers’ body camera usage. Unlike campus sexual assault,
which already has a statutory system in place, California law on body camera
usage is currently sparse.142
The California legislature introduced two body camera-related bills during
the 2015 Session: AB 66 and AB 69.143 AB 66 failed to pass out of committee.144
Governor Brown signed AB 69 into law as Chapter 461.145 Both bills governed a
different aspect of law enforcement officers’ body camera usage.146 AB 66 would
have restricted an officer’s authority to record and disclose footage, while also
requiring that officers make a reasonable effort to notify people that they are
147
being recorded.
Chapter 461 requires law enforcement agencies to establish
policies on categorization of body camera footage and provides minimum
148
retention periods for body camera footage.
Allowing campus police to use body cameras but failing to regulate their
usage thrusts campus police officers into the debate regarding what policies
149
should govern body camera usage. Although there is public agreement that
138. See DeForest, supra note 137 (illustrating the push for officer use of body cameras following
controversial use-of-force incidents).
139. See MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 6
(2014), available at https://www.ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/files/spotlight/download/Police_Officer_
Body-Worn_Cameras.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing that there is
anecdotal support for the civilizing effect).
140. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West 2015) (prohibiting electronic recording of
communications without the consent of both parties), with PENAL § 633.02 (enacted by Chapter 159) (showing
that Penal Code section 632 does not apply to Chapter 159 for the use of body cameras).
141. See PENAL § 633.02 (enacted by Chapter 159) (failing to specify any policies on how body cameras
should be used or operated).
142. Supra Part II.B–C.
143. AB 66, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on May 6, 2015); AB 69, 2016 Leg.,
2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as enacted on Oct. 3, 2015).
144. Current Bill Status of AB 66, http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=
201520160AB66 (last visited Oct. 18, 2015) (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review)
145. AB 69, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as enacted on Oct. 3, 2015)
146. Compare AB 66, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on May 6, 2015) (containing
provisions governing when officers may record or disclose footage), with AB 69, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess.
(Cal. 2015) (as enacted on Oct. 3, 2015) (containing provisions controlling the handling of body camera
footage).
147. See AB 66, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on May 6, 2015) (containing no
provision requiring officers to record certain situations).
148. AB 69, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as enacted on Oct. 3, 2015)
149. See Henry Gass, Body Camera Video is Coming, But Who Gets to Watch It?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (July 16, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2015/0716/Body-camera-video-is-coming-
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officers should use body cameras, there is controversy and debate on what
policies should govern their use.150 The two perceived benefits of body cameras
are accountability and transparency.151 Campus police policies should balance the
need to be open and transparent with the public against the dangers that recording
and disclosing body camera footage poses to privacy.152 Campus police should
take this balancing into account when they determine the procedures for when
officers should record, how the footage should be stored, and when to disclose
footage to the public.153
V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 159 removes the eavesdropping and recording restrictions on
campus officers in their campus sexual assault investigations.154 There are
concerns that the current statutory system for handling campus sexual assault
may be problematic for accused students’ rights by allowing evidence from
previously unavailable investigation methods and could have a chilling effect on
the freedom of speech, the right to assemble, and the right to privacy.155
Moreover, the lack of body camera laws requires campus police departments who
use body cameras to carefully consider what policies to adopt while the laws are
still developing.156
Chapter 159 does not deal with the issues underlying the high rates of
157
campus sexual assaults. Nor does Chapter 159 deal directly with the reasons
behind the accusations and resulting investigations of universities and college
158
campuses for mishandling sexual assault cases under Title IX. Chapter 159 is
crafted in a way that appears to avoid controversy, considering that: (1) it only
expands campus police surveillance expansion to sexual assault cases; (2) it does

but-who-gets-to-watch-it (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing that there is
disagreement about what the transparency and accountability balance for body cameras policies should look
like).
150. Id.
151. Considering Police Body Cameras: Developments in the Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1794 (2015).
152. See Grant Rodgers, Public Body Camera Footage has a Downside, Police Say, DES MOINES
REGISTER (July 3, 2015), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crime-and-courts/2015/07/03/bodycamera-public-footage-crimes-first-amendment/29680705/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (noting that department has to make a case-by-case calls that balances openness with privacy when
disclosing footage to public); see also Gass, supra note 149 (showing agreement by all sides of the debate that
privacy concerns must be balanced with public accountability).
153. See MILLER & TOLIVER, supra note 74, at 12, 15 (showing that footage disclosure decisions have
significant privacy implications).
154. CAL. PENAL CODE § 633.02(a) (enacted by Chapter 159).
155. Supra Part IV.A–B.
156. Supra Part IV.C.
157. See PENAL § 633.02 (enacted by Chapter 159) (focusing only on campus police capability to
investigate sexual assaults).
158. Id.
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not affect Penal Code section 633; and (3) it does not impose upon free speech,
assembly, or privacy.159 However, the limited scope of Chapter 159 does not limit
its importance.160 Chapter 159 brings campus policing more in line with
traditional law enforcement, granting campus police the same investigatory
powers for sexual assaults and body camera usage.161 Chapter 159 is an important
step towards the resolution of campus sexual assault cases, despite unresolved
162
policy concerns.

159. Id.
160. See supra Part IV.A (showing the limited expansion of the law).
161. Compare PENAL § 633 (West 2015) (explicitly allowing for the admission of evidence obtained
under this provision), with PENAL § 633.02 (enacted by Chapter 159) (containing no language allowing for the
admission of evidence obtain under this provision).
162. Supra Part IV.A.
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